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Defogging the Future: The Effect of American Electric Power on
Future Lawsuits

American Electric Power Co. Inc., v. Connecticut'

I.

INTRODUCTION

The question of whether human activities are responsible for
global warming has been a subject of debate and study for decades, and
yet, remains unsolved.2 Nevertheless, lawsuits alleging harm due to
global warming have flooded the courts in recent years. One recent
Supreme Court case concerning global warming issues was American
Electric Power Co. Inc., v. Connecticut.3 In American Electric, the
plaintiffs alleged the defendants' carbon dioxide emissions contributed to
global warming, and therefore interfered with the rights of the public.
Regrettably, the Supreme Court glazed over two major issues: why the
plaintiffs had Article III standing, and why the political question doctrine
failed to prevent the case from proceeding. Furthermore, the Court left

' 131 S. Ct. 2527 (2011) ("American Electric").
2Catalina

Camia, Climate change skeptic Inhofe endorses Rick Perry, USA TODAY (Aug.
29, 2011), availableat
http://content.usatoday.com/communities/onpolitics/post/2011./08/rick-perry-jamesinhofe-presidential-endorsement-/1.
3

American Electric, 131 S. Ct. at 2527.

4 Id. at

2534.
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other questions regarding future possible causes of action unanswered.
Due to the lack of guidance provided by American Electric, future litigants
will struggle to predict the threshold needed for Article III standing, the
effect of political question doctrine, and whether state common law and
state statutory law will be preempted by the Clean Air Act. However, it
may still be possible to predict American Electric's effect on future cases
regarding greenhouse gas emissions by examining American Electric,its
history, and the precedent created by similar cases decided by the Supreme
Court.

II.

FACTS AND HOLDING

In American Electric Power Co. Inc., v. Connecticut,; the Court
held the Clean Air Act and the Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA")
displaced and removed the right to sue under federal common law public
nuisance claims. 6 In July 2004, two groups of plaintiffs filed separate
complaints in the Southern District of New York against five major
electric power companies. The first group of plaintiffs included New
York City and eight states. The second group was comprised of three

' Id. at 2532.
6

Id. Greenhouse emission suits cannot no longer be brought under
federal common law
public nuisance. See id. Congress granted the EPA the authority to regulate greenhouse
emissions; therefore the emissions were no longer covered under federal common law.
See id.
7
8

Am. Elec. Power Co., Inc. v. Connecticut, 131 S. Ct. 2527,
2533 (2011).
Id. at 2533-34. The eight states were Connecticut, New York,
California,

Iowa, New
Jersey, Rhode Island, Vermont, and Wisconsin. Connecticutv. Am. Elec. Power Co.,
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non-profit land trusts. 9 The plaintiffs alleged the defendants' "carbondioxide emissions created a 'substantial and unreasonable interference
with public rights" in violation of either the federal common law of
interstate nuisance or state tort law.' 0 The plaintiffs sought injunctive
relief requiring each defendant to cap its carbon dioxide ("C0 2")
emissions while reducing its emissions by a certain percentage each year
for at least a decade."
The district court dismissed both suits on the ground that the suits
raised political questions, which, under the political question doctrine,
cannot be decided by a court.12 However, the Second Circuit reversed the
district court, holding the plaintiffs were not barred by the political
question doctrine and the plaintiffs had standing to bring their claims.' 3
The Second Circuit also held the plaintiffs had stated a claim under the

Inc., 406 F. Supp. 2d 265, 267 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) vacated and remanded,582 F.3d 309 (2d
Cir. 2009) rev'd, 131 S. Ct. 2527, 180 L. Ed. 2d 435 (U.S. 2011).
9

American Electric, 131 S. Ct. at 2534.

0

Id.

1 Id.
Id. The political question doctrine exists to maintain the separation of power in each
branch of the federal government. See Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224, 228 (1993).
12

Am. Elec. Power Co., Inc. v. Connecticut, 131 S. Ct. 2527, 2534 (2011). Article III
Standing has three elements: (1) the plaintiff must have suffered an injury in fact; (2)
there must be a causal connection between the injury and conduct of the defendant; (3) it
is likely a favorable outcome will redress the injury. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504
U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992).
13

181

DEFOGGING THE FUTURE

federal common law of nuisance, which the Clean Air Act had not

displaced. 14
The United States Supreme Court affirmed the Second Circuit's
exercise of jurisdiction' 5 in a four-to-four vote.1 6 The Supreme Court
went on to reverse the Second Circuit, holding the Clean Air Act and the
EPA's authority displaced "any federal common law to seek abatement of
carbon dioxide emissions from fossil-fuel fired power plants," even if the
EPA had not yet set standards governing emissions from power plants. 17

III.

A.

LEGAL BACKGROUND

The Clean Air Act and the EPA

The first federal legislation to address the problem of air pollution
was the Air Pollution Control Act of 1955, which set aside funds for

14American Electric, 131

S. Ct. at 2534.

1s The plaintiffs had Article III standing under Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497
(2007).
Am. Elec. Power Co., Inc. v. Connecticut, 131 S. Ct. 2527, 2535 (2011).
When a court
has a tie vote, the decision of the lower court is affirmed. See 28 U.S.C. § 2109 (2006).
Justice Sotomayor recused herself because she heard the case while she was
still on the Second Circuit. Benjamin Ewing, & Douglas A. Kysar, Prods and Pleas:
Limited Government in an Era of UnlimitedHarm, 121 Yale L.J. 350, 404 (2011).
16

1

American Electric, 131 S. Ct. at 2537.
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federal research into the scope and cause of air pollution. 18 Later, the
Clean Air Act of 1963 established a federal program, under the United
States Public Health Service, to research techniques for monitoring and
controlling air pollution.' 9
In 1967, Congress enacted the Air Quality Act, which amended the
Clean Air Act, and significantly expanded the federal government's
involvement by establishing automobile emission standards. 20 The Air
Quality Act also authorized more expansive studies and monitoring of air
pollutant emissions, and the use of control techniques involving interstate
transport pollutants.2 1
The Clean Air Act of 1970 represented a shift in the federal
government's involvement in air pollution control by authorizing the
creation of both federal and state regulations to control stationary 22 and
mobile sources of air pollution.2 3 Shortly after its passage, Congress
passed the National Environmental Policy Act establishing the U.S.

18 History of the

Clean Air Act, U.S. EPA, (last updated Nov. 16, 2010),
http://www.epa.gov/air/caa/caa-history.html.
9

Id.

20

History of the CleanAir Act, supranote 18; Air Quality Act, Pub. L. No. 90-148, 81
Stat. 485 (1967).
21 History of the

Clean Air Act, supranote 18.

Id. The stationary sources of pollution were usually industrial. Id. There were also
four major programs created to regulate stationary sources: the National Ambient Air
Quality Standards, State Implementation Plans, New Source Performance Standards, and
National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants. Id.
22

23

Id. See Clean Air Act, Pub. L. No. 91-604, 77 Stat. 392 (1970).
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Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA") to implement the Clean Air
Act's provisions. 24
The Clean Air Act was further amended in 1977 to promote the
achievement and maintenance of National Ambient Air Quality Standards
("NAAQS"). 25 For areas that already met the NAAQS, the amendments
contained provisions requiring the Prevention of Significant Deterioration
("PSD"). 26 The amendments also addressed the requirements for areas
that have not met the NAAQS. 2 7
Congress enacted its last major amendment to the Clean Air Act in
1990, increasing federal authority and responsibility by creating new areas
of regulatory control: the control of acid rain (Acid Deposition Control)
and the issuance of operating permits for stationary sources of pollution. 28
The 1990 amendments also expanded and modified provisions dealing
with the attainment and maintenance of NAAQS. 2 9 Finally, the 1990
amendment created a program to phase out the use of chemicals that
depleted the ozone layer. 30

24 History of the Clean Air Act, supra note 18.
25

d

26

d

Id. The non-attainment areas for NAAQS are geographical
areas "that [do] not meet
one or more of the federal air quality standards." Id.
27

28

Id. See Clean Air Act, Pub. L. No. 101-549, 104 Stat. 2399 (1990);
Supra note 22 and
accompanying text.
29 History of the Clean Air Act, supra note 18.
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On the international level, negotiations aimed at curbing climate
change began at the Rio de Janeiro Earth Summit in 1992.31 Several
countries signed the Kyoto Protocol in 1997, which went into effect in
2005.32 From 2008 to 2012, the Kyoto Protocol required countries to
reduce greenhouse emissions to five percent below the emission levels of
1990.33 The Copenhagen Conference, which took place in December
2009, further opened the doors for global cooperation by recognizing the
need to limit the increase in global temperature to 2 degrees Celsius below
pre-industrial levels. 34 The countries agreed to monitor their efforts at
reducing the global temperature, and report to the United Nations every
two years. 35 More recently, world leaders met and signed the Cancun
Agreements, which included a schedule for reviewing the efforts to
maintain global temperature levels and to assess the need for stricter
36
standards in the future. The Cancun Agreements produced the most

" CHRISTIAN DE PERTHUIS, ECONOMIC CHOICES IN A WARMING WORLD

5 (Michael

Westlake trans., 2011).
Id. The United States refused to sign because the Kyoto Protocol did not set emission
limits on developing countries. Id. at 199.
32

Kyoto Protocol,UNITED NATIONS FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON CLIMATE CHANGE
(2011), http://unfccc.int/kyotoprotocol/items/2830.php.
3

34

DE PERTHUIS, supra note 31, at 200-16; Copenhagen Climate Deal meets

QualifiedUN

Welcome, BBC NEWS (Dec. 19, 2009), available at
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/science/nature/8422133.stm.
" U.N. FCCC, 15th Sess., at 2, U.N. Doc. FCCC/CP/2009/L. (Dec. 18, 2009), available
at unfccc.int/resource/docs/2009/cop 15/eng/107.pdf.
The Cancun Agreements, UNITED NATIONS FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON CLIMATE
CHANGE (2011), http://cancun.unfccc.int/cancun-agreements/significance-of-the-keyagreements-reached-at-cancun/#c45. Like the Copenhagen Conference, the agreements
are not legally binding. Jacob Werksman, Q&A: The Legal Characterand Legitimacy of
the CancunAgreements, World Resources Institute, (Dec. 17, 2010),
36

185

DEFOGGING THE FUTURE

comprehensive package to help developing countries keep their carbon
emissions low.3 7 The most recent conference, the United Nations Climate
Change Conference, took place in November 2011 in Durban, South
Africa.38 The Parties agreed to adopt a universal legal agreement,
regarding climate change, before 2015.39

B.

Climate Control

In 1850, the concentration of CO 2 in the global atmosphere was
280 parts per million ("ppm"). 40 The concentration reached 380 ppm by
2005, and continues to increase at a rate of about 2 ppm per year.4 1 The
CO 2 concentration will have almost doubled by the end of the twenty-first
century as compared to levels during the pre-industrial age. 42 Meanwhile,
http://www.wri.org/stories/2010/1 2 /qa-legal-character-and-legitimacy-cancunagreements.
The CancunAgreements, UNITED NATIONS FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON CLIMATE
CHANGE (2011), http://cancun.unfccc.int/cancun-agreements/significance-of-the-keyagreements-reached-at-cancun/#c45.
38

Meetings, UNITED NATIONS FRAMEWORK ON CLIMATE
CHANGE (2011)
http://unfccc.int/2860.php.
39

DurbanClimate Change Conference - November/December 2011, UNITED NATIONS
FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON CLIMATE CHANGE (2011),
http://unfccc.int/meetings/durbannov2011 /meeting/6245.php.
40

DE PERTHUIS, supra note 31, at
17.
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researchers at the University of California-Berkeley found the earth's
surface temperature has increased about 1.8 degrees Fahrenheit since the
1950s. 43 Many scientists believe if drastic measures are not taken to
combat the climate change, the economic progress that developing nations
have made could stall or even reverse by 2050."
During the 2008 presidential election, global warming was
Now, only a few years later, global warming
one of the key issues.
46
has largely fallen to the political wayside in the United States. Unlike
the United States, global powers such as Australia, the European Union,
and China, have passed legislation to greatly reduce the amount of their
carbon dioxide emissions. 4 7 The United States remains the only
"significant outlier."48 With comparable living standards, the carbon

43 Robert Rohde Et Al., Berkeley Earth TemperatureAveraging Process, Berkeley Earth

Surface Temperature 1, 2 (submitted for peer review October 2011),
http://berkeleyearth.org/Resources/Berkeley_Earth-AveragingProcess.pdf.
" Rachel Nuwer, Climate Change Imperils GlobalProsperity, U.N. Warns, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 2, 2011, http://green.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/11/02/climate-change-imperilsglobal-prosperity-u-n-warns/. The effects of extreme weather caused by water and air
pollution can greatly affect the production of crops in agricultural countries. Id. In
addition, pollution also causes poor air quality, resulting in respiratory illnesses and
death. Id.
Elisabeth Rosenthal, Where Did Global Warming Go?, N.Y. TIMEs, Oct. 15, 2011,
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/16/sunday-review/whatever-happened-to-globalwarming.html?ref-globalwarming.
45
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emissions per capita from the United States are almost double that of
Europe's and Japan's combined.49
In sharp contrast to the rest of the United States, California has
adopted a system that sets limits on greenhouse emissions and creates
incentives for oil refineries, electricity generators and other polluters to
clean up their plants.5 0 California's plan, which takes effect in 2013,
offers a financial incentive aimed at helping companies end the status quo
of CO2 emissions. 5'

C.

Article III Standing

Another method of limiting CO 2 emissions, besides legislation, is
through the courts. Standing is one of the requirements under Article III
of the United States Constitution for a claim to be heard in federal court.5 2

49 DE PERTHUIS, supra note 31, at 63.
50

Felicity Barringer, CaliforniaAdopts Limits on Greenhouse Gases, N.Y. TIMES, Oct.
15, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/21 /business/energy-environment/califomiaadopts-cap-and-trade-system-to-limit-emissions.html?_r-1 &ref-globalwarming. By
2020, the regulations will have reduced greenhouse emissions to the 1990 levels. Id. The
incentives are called cap and trade. Id. In a cap and trade system, the government will
set a cap on the amount of greenhouse emission each plant will be allowed to produce.
Id. The plants will be issued permits. Id. If a plant emits less greenhouse emissions than
its cap, then the plant can sell its extra permits, earning a profit. Id.
1 Id.
52

Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 206 (1962).
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In addition to standing, a case must not contain a political question,53 be
4
,54
5556
"ripe, not "moot," 5 and cannot ask for an advisory opinion. The
standing requirement exists to ensure the parties have a concrete stake in
the controversy to justify employing the resources of the federal courts. 57
Three requirements must be met in order for the plaintiff to have Article
III standing: (1) the plaintiff must have suffered an injury in fact,5 8 (2)
,

53

Infra note 58-64 and accompanying text.

Ripeness is designed to prevent the courts, "through avoidance of premature
adjudication, from entangling themselves in abstract disagreements over administrative
policies, and also to protect the agencies from judicial interference until an administrative
decision has been formalized and its effects felt in a concrete way by the challenging
parties." Nat'l Park Hospitality Ass'n v. U.S. Dep't of Interior, 538 U.S. 803, 807-08
(2003). In order to evaluate whether an action is ripe for review, the court will look at (1)
the fitness of the issues for judicial decision and (2) the hardship to the parties of
withholding court consideration. Id. at 808.
$4

ss If a case is rendered moot, then the court lack jurisdiction to hear the issue. Iron
Arrow Honor Soc'y v. Heckler, 464 U.S. 67, 70 (1983). A case becomes moot when the
issues "presented are no longer 'live' or the parties lack a legally cognizable interest in
the outcome." Los Angeles County v. Davis, 440 U.S. 625, 631 (1979). A party lacks a
legally cognizable interest in the outcome when (1) it is very unlikely that the alleged
violation will recur and (2) interim relief or events have completely stopped the effects of
the alleged violation. Id. (internal citations omitted).
s6 U.S. v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 171 (1974); Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 96 (1968).
See Baker, 369 U.S. at 204; Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Services
(TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 170 (2000). The EPA cannot be sued if an action has already
has already commenced and is "diligently prosecuting." 33 U.S.C. § 1365(b)(1)(B)
(2006); Friends of the Earth, 528 U.S. at 175.
5

In order for there to be an injury-in-fact, there must be an (a) invasion of
the legally
protected interest that is concrete and particularized and (b) the invasion must be actual or
imminent. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992). In order to
58
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there must be a causal connection between the injury and conduct of the
defendant, and (3) it must be likely that a favorable outcome will redress
the injury.59

D.

The PoliticalQuestion Doctrine

In addition to establishing standing, 60 a claimant in federal court
must show the issue presented is not a political question. 6 1 Federal courts
cannot decide an issue if there is "a textually demonstrable constitutional
commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department." 62 Political
questions are identified by looking at the issue and its relationship
between the judiciary and the other two branches of the federal
government.'63 The political question doctrine exists to maintain the
separation of powers among the federal government's three branches, and
the analysis under the doctrine should be done on a case-by-case basis.
show injury for Article III standing, the plaintiff has to show injury to himself, and not
the environment. Friendsof the Earth, 528 U.S. at 181.
59

Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560-61 (internal citations omitted). The plaintiff must demonstrate
his standing. Richardson,418 U.S. at 172.
Article III has the requirement of case-or-controversy. Lujan, 504 U.S. at
559-61.
Article III standing only requires a court to find injury-in-fact, causation, and the injury is
redressable. Id It does not require the court to consider ripeness, mootness, etc. Id.
60

61 Baker

v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 209 (1962).

63

Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224, 228 (1993) (quoting Baker, 369 U.S.
at 217).

63

Baker, 369 U.S. at 210.

' Id. at 210-11.
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The courts will ask whether there is "a lack of judicially discoverable and
manageable standards for resolving" the claims presented.65 There are
also four other factors set forth in Baker66 to consider in determining
whether a controversy is a political question: (1) how difficult would it be
for the courts to decide without an initial policy determination that is
clearly meant for nonjudical discretion; (2) whether the court would
infringe on the other branches' powers; (3) if there is an unusual need to
adhere to a political decision already made; and (4) the potential

embarrassment of mixed messages from various departments on one

question. 6 7

IV.

INSTANT DECISION

Justice Ginsburg delivered the opinion of the Supreme Court,
beginning with the issues of Article III standing and the political question
doctrine.68 Four justices held the plaintiffs had Article III standing under

61

d. at 217.

In Baker v. Carr,plaintiffs alleged the denial of equal protection under the Fourteenth
Amendment because the votes of rural citizens were worth more than urban citizens
because the legislative districts had not been redrawn. 369 U.S. at 187-88. The state of
Texas argued that the Court could not hear the case because of the political question
doctrine. Id. at 196. The Supreme Court eventually held that the case was not barred
under the political question doctrine. Id. at 237.
66

Spectrum Stores, Inc. v. Citgo Petroleum Corp., 632 F.3d 938, 953 (5th Cir. 2011),
cert. denied, 10-1371, 2011 WL 4536527 (U.S. Oct. 3, 2011), and cert. denied, 10-1393,
2011 WL 4536529 (U.S. Oct. 3, 2011).
67

68

Am. Elec. Power Co. Inc. v. Connecticut, 131 S. Ct. 2527, 2534 (2011).
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Massachusetts.69 However, the four other justices either agreed with
dissent of Massachusetts v. EPA, or held Massachusetts v. EPA was

distinguishable from the current case. 70 Due to an equally divided bench,
the Court affirmed the Second Circuit's exercise ofjurisdiction.7 1
In Massachusetts v. EPA, the Supreme Court held the state of
Massachusetts had standing to petition for review 72 of whether the Clean
Air Act authorized the EPA to regulate greenhouse gas emissions from
new motor vehicles in the event the EPA forms a "judgment" that such
emissions contribute to climate change. Furthermore, the EPA can avoid

Id. at 2531
70

Id. at 2535.

7'

id

Massachusetts v. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 549 U.S. 497, 526 (2007). When Congress
gives a litigant a procedural right to protect his concrete interests, "the right to challenge
agency action unlawfully withheld can assert that right without meeting all the normal
standards for redressability and immediacy." Id. at 517-18 (internal citations omitted).
Massachusetts has standing if there is "a possibility that the requested relief will prompt
the injury - causing a party to reconsider the decision that allegedly harmed the litigant."
Id.at 518 (internal citations omitted). Massachusetts is also a sovereign State, and has an
interest in protecting its quasi-sovereign interests. Id. at 520. Massachusetts has also
alleged injury, in that global sea levels have risen as a result of global warming, and will
continue to do so. Id. at 522. Furthermore, Massachusetts owns a substantial amount of
state coastal property, which will either be permanently or temporarily lost. Id. The EPA
has not disputed the causal connection between greenhouse gases and global warming.
Id. at 523. Therefore, the EPA's refusal to regulate emissions will contribute to
Massachusetts' damages. Id. Massachusetts' risk will be somewhat reduced if the state
receives the relief sought. Id. at 526.
72

7

Id. at 528. One of the EPA's arguments was that greenhouse gases were not included

in the Clean Air Act's definition of air pollutants. Id. at 511. However, the statute
defines greenhouse gases as "any air pollution agent or combination of such agents,
including any physical, chemical ... substance or matter which is emitted into other
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taking regulatory action with respect to greenhouse gas emissions from
new motor vehicles only if it can either determine that greenhouse gases
do not contribute to climate change or provide some reasonable
explanation as to why the EPA cannot or will not exercise its discretion to
determine whether it has the authority. 74
In Massachusetts v. EPA's dissent, the minority opinion stated the
plaintiffs' claims were nonjusticiable because there was no judgment on
whether global warming exists, what causes it, or the extent of the
problem. 75 The Court believed the Article III standing requirements
should not be relaxed merely because the injuries are asserted by a state. 76

otherwise enters the ambient air." 42 U.S.C. § 7602(g) (2006). Therefore, greenhouse
gases are included within the definition, and the EPA is authorized to regulate the gases.
Massachusetts,549 U.S. at 529. Secondly, the EPA has affirmed that it had authority to
regulate greenhouse gases in 1998. Id. at 531. There is no reason to read ambiguity into
the statute. Id. Lastly, the EPA has the duty to protect the public's health and welfare.
Id. at 532. There is no reason why two agencies, the EPA and DOT's mandate to
promote energy efficiency, cannot both fulfill their obligations, and avoid
inconsistencies. Id.
74

Id. at 533. The EPA also declined to regulate greenhouse gases due to policy concerns.
Id. Nevertheless, under the Clean Air Act, the EPA can only avoid taking action if the
agency determines that greenhouse gases do not contribute to global warming. Id. The
EPA also cannot avoid its responsibilities due to the uncertainty of climate change. Id. at
534. All that matter is if there is enough information to make an endangerment finding.

Id.
7s

Massachusetts v. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 549 U.S. 497, 535 (2007).

76

Id. at. 536. There is no basis or support for relaxing Article III standing in precedent.
Id. 42. U.S.C. § 7607(b)(1) (2006) does not give States any special rights or status. Id. at
537. Case law does not treat public and private litigants any differently. Id. The injury
asserted must be concrete and particularized. Id. at 541. There is not enough in the
plaintiffs' declaration to have a concrete and particularized injury. Id. Furthermore,
assertions of possible future injury will not satisfy Article III standing. Id. There is also
193
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Environmental protection falls within Congress' power to regulate.
A specialized federal common law has emerged, allowing federal
common law suits brought by a state against another state to enjoin
pollution being emitting from that state. However, when Congress
legislatively provides for claims formerly under federal common law, it is
displaced when the statue "speak[s] directly at [the] issue."79 In American
Electric, the Court held that the EPA displaced federal common law
because Congress authorized the EPA to control greenhouse gases.so

V.

COMMENT

American Electric left many questions unanswered. The Supreme
Court held that federal common law nuisance claims had been displaced
by the EPA. 8 ' However, the Court chose not to discuss why it found the
plaintiffs had Article III standing or why the political question doctrine

no causation because the connection between global warming and motor vehicles is too
speculative. Id. at 544. In order for Massachusetts' injury to be redressable, the relief
must be likely to cure the injury. Id. at 546. It is unlikely that regulating domestic motor
vehicle emissions will reduce carbon dioxide in the atmosphere, and therefore redress
Massachusetts' asserted loss of land. Id.
n Am. Elec. Power Co. Inc., v. Connecticut, 131 S. Ct. 2527, 2535 (2011).
78

79

id.

Id. at 2538.
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was not a barrier in this case. 82 The mystery surrounding Article III
standing, the political question doctrine, and the possible preemption of
state statutory law and state common law will cause more litigation as
parties try to determine what suits will be permitted after American
Electric.

A.

The Future ofArticle III Standing

Even after American Electric,Article III standing will unlikely
prevent plaintiffs from bringing suit. American Electric was an
opportunity for the Supreme Court to clarify the issue of Article III
Standing for greenhouse gas emissions lawsuits.8 3 Unfortunately, the
Court neglected to explain why at least some of the plaintiffs had Article
III Standing. 84 The Court simply stated:

"[flour members of the Court would hold that at least some
plaintiffs have Article III standing under Massachusetts,
which permitted a State to challenge EPA's refusal to
regulate greenhouse gas emissions... and.. .no other
threshold obstacle bars review. Four members of the Court,

82

d

83 Article

III standing requires (1) the plaintiffs suffer an actual injury, (2) the injury must
be caused by the defendant, and (3) the courts must be able to provide a remedy for that
injury. Supra notes 13, 55-57.
8

Am. Elec. Power Co. Inc., v. Connecticut, 131 S. Ct. 2527, 2535 (2011).
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adhering to a dissenting opinion in Massachusetts.. .or
regarding that decision as distinguishable, would hold that
none of the plaintiffs have Article III standing. We
therefore affirm, by an equally divided Court, the Second
Circuit's exercise of jurisdiction and proceed to the
merits."85

Even though the Supreme Court merely affirmed the Second
Circuit's exercise of jurisdiction, at least one scholar has suggested that
the Court is likely to hold there is Article III standing for similar cases in
the future.86 However, it is still unknown how the Justices decided the
question of standing: was their decision based on Massachusetts v. EPA,
distinguished from Massachusetts v. EPA, or did the decision lower the
standard for standing.
One problem with standing under Article III is that the
requirements are very indistinct and therefore, difficult to predict how a
court will apply them. For example, the first element of standing requires
the plaintiff have an actual injury. However, what qualifies as an injury is
unclear. Using Massachusetts v. EPA as an example, global sea levels
rising between ten and twenty centimeters over the last century as a result
of global warming, and Massachusetts' costal property eventually being
lost due to the rising sea levels was held to be an injury. 7 Almost
anything can be considered an injury, giving courts wide discretion in

85 Id.
86

James R. May, AEP v. Connecticut and the Futureofthe
PoliticalQuestion

121 YALE L.J. ONiNE 127, 130 (2011).
87

Massachusetts v. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 549 U.S.
497, 522-23 (2007).
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deciding which cases to hear. If a court wants to hear a case, then the
court could simply say there was an injury; and, if the court does not want
to hear a case, then there was no injury.
In Massachusettsv. EPA, for the second element of Article III
standing, the Court also needed to decide if there was causation between
global warming and the rising of the sea levels, leading to the eventual
loss of land.88 Due to the controversies regarding global warming, the
Court could have decided the issue of causation based on how certain the
Court felt that global warming is affecting the earth. If the Court believed
in the existence of global warming, then the rising of the sea levels could
be caused by the carbon dioxide emissions, and therefore, the element of
causation would be satisfied. However, if the Court did not believe in
global warming, then the Court would have found no causation between
the rising of the sea levels and the carbon dioxide emissions. 89 Similar to
the first element, the Court had broad discretion in deciding if the second
element of Article III standing was met.
Moreover, the discretion given to the court demonstrates another
problem with the standing doctrine. In order to decide Massachusetts v.
EPA, the Court first had to decide if global warming existed and whether it
was harmful. However, in deciding global warming did exist and was
harmful, the Court also examined the merits of the case because without
global warming due to greenhouse gases, there could be no injury and
causation, as required by Article III standing. By examining and deciding
that injury and causation, some of the requirements for Article III
88

See id. at 523-24.

89 In Massachusetts v. E.P.A., the Court was confident about the effect of global

warming; however, a few years later the Court backed away from its stance to a more
equivocal one. Maxine Burkett, ClimateJustice and the Elusive Climate Tort, 121 Yale
L.J. Online 115, 118 (2011).
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standing, were sufficient, the Court had already proceeded to examine the
merits of the case.
The issue of Article III standing is currently uncertain due to the
lack of explanation by the Supreme Court, but it is likely the courts will
continue to accept that there is standing for plaintiffs who claim injury due
to greenhouse emissions.90 With the requirements of Article III standing
met, the would-be litigants are free to present their cases in federal court,
as long as the other threshold requirements are met. 91

B.

PoliticalQuestion Doctrine

Another hurdle litigants have to pass before a court is willing to
consider the merits of a case is the political question doctrine. However,
the Supreme Court failed to clarify why the political question doctrine did
not bar the plaintiffs in American Electric. The political doctrine is a selfimposed limitation on the courts designed to ensure the separation of
powers.92 If the courts were to decide political questions, it would
undermine the federal government's constitutionally created system of
checks and balances.93 The political question doctrine is used to prevent

9o

Adler, surpa note 90, at 313.

91 Supra notes 53-54.
92

Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 211 (1962).

Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power Co., Inc., 406 F. Supp. 2d 265, 267 (S.D.N.Y.
2005)
vacatedand remanded, 582 F.3d 309 (2d Cir. 2009) rev'd, 131 S. Ct. 2527, (2011).

9
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the judicial branch from performing the functions of the executive and
legislative branches. 94
Justice Ginsburg, Kennedy, Breyer, and Kagan held that the
political question doctrine did not bar the plaintiffs' case.9 5 Furthermore,
Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Scalia joined the majority opinion
without commenting on the issue of the political question doctrine. 96
Justice Alito and Thomas concurred, but also did not remark upon the
political question doctrine. 97 Lastly, it is believed that Justice Sotomayor 98
would have likely sided with the Justices that found the plaintiffs had
Article III standing. 99 Therefore, there are four Justices who believe that
the political question doctrine did not bar this case. It can also be assumed
from the silence of the other four Justices, and Justice Sotomayor's time
on the Second Circuit, 00 that the other Justices at the very least do not
disagree with how the political question doctrine was applied.' 0 '
The history of the political question doctrine suggests the Supreme
Court was correct in concluding the doctrine did not bar this case from

94

Baker, 369 U.S. at 211.

95 id

98

Justice Sotomayor recused herself.

9 Jonathan H. Adler, The Supreme Court Disposes ofA Nuisance Suit: American Electric
Power v. Connecticut, CATO SUP. CT. REv., 2010-2011, at 295, 313.
' Justice Sotomayor did not participate in the decision on the Second Circuit.
101May, supranote 85, at 130.
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proceeding. However, federal common law is developed through case
law, which is crafted by the judiciary. Neither the executive or legislative
branches have any part in creating federal common law. The political
question doctrine has always been applied to constitutional issues, not
federal common law.' 02 The doctrine was kept within its boundaries when
the Court refused to expand the use of it in American Electric.

C.

The Future of Greenhouse Gas Emission Claims

After the Supreme Court decided there were no Article III or
political question obstacles, it proceeded to the merits. Looking back at
Massachusettsv. EPA, the Supreme Court held the EPA had the authority
to regulate and set standards for greenhouse gas emissions.1 03 The EPA
has agreed to set greenhouse gas emission standards from fossil fuel-fired
power plants by May 2012.104 States and private parties may petition for
Brief of Law Professors as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents at 14, Am. Elec.
Power Co., Inc. v. Connecticut, 131 S. Ct. 2527 (2011) (No. 2011 WL 970338). In
interpreting constitutional issues, the Supreme Court has the final word. See Marbury v.
Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 146 (1803). Conversely, judicially-created federal common law is
easily replaced by either of the two branches. See Am. Elec. Power Co., Inc. v.
Connecticut, 131 S. Ct. 2527, 2537 (2011). In order to replace federal common law, the
statute or regulation replacing the common law does not even have to specifically address
it. Id. The statute only has to touch upon the issue. Id. Thus, preempting federal
common law is much more easily done than preempting state law.
102

103

549 U.S. at 535.

See Proposed Settlement Agreement, Clean Air Act Citizen Suit, 75 Fed. Reg. 8239201 (Dec. 30, 2010); Reply Brief for Tennessee Valley Authority as Respondent
Supporting Petitioners at 18, Am. Elec. Power Co., Inc. v. Connecticut, 131 S. Ct. 2527
(2011) (No. 10-174); Am. Elec., 131 S. Ct. at 2533. On April 13, 2012, the EPA issued a
10
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rulemaking' 05 if the EPA does not set standards, and the EPA's disposition
of such petitions is typically reviewable by the federal courts.106 The
Clean Air Act also gives citizens the ability to bring civil suit against the
United States or governmental agency. 0 7 However, even if the EPA has
the authority to set regulations and refuses to do so, courts should not set
the greenhouse gas emission standards, though a court may be forced to do
so under federal common law.' 0 8
The Supreme Court in American Electric held the Clean Air Act
displaces federal common law in regards to limiting carbon dioxide
emissions - "[t]here is no room for a parallel track." 09 Furthermore, the
actual displacement of federal common law takes place when Congress

proposed rule setting new source performance standards for carbon dioxide in new fossil
fuel-fired steam and combined cycle electric utility generating units ("EGU") capable of
generating more than 25 megawatts. Standards of Performance for Greenhouse Gas
Emissions for New Stationary Sources: Electric Utility Generating Units, 77 Fed. Reg.
22392 (Apr. 13, 2012). Only new fossil fuel EGUs would be subject to a maximum
carbon dioxide emissions rate of 1,000 pounds per megawatt-hour. Id. The proposed
rule also contains an alternative compliance opinion, allowing new coal-fired EGUs to be
built without meeting the proposed standard if: the EGUs (1) emits less than 1,800
pounds per megawatt for the first 10 years of its operation; and (2) the EGUs commit to
reducing their carbon emissions to below 600 pounds per megawatt for the next twenty
years. Id.
i0 5 U.S.C. § 553(e) (2006) (petitioning for rulemaking is a process where interested
parties can petition an agency for the issuance or amendment of a rule). Id.
American Electric, 131 S. Ct. at 2538. The EPA agreed to set the standards due to a
litigation settlement. Id.
'1

U.S.C. § 7607(b)(1) (2006); Massachusetts v. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 549
U.S. 497, 516-17, 529, 535 (2007).
107See 42

108Am.

Elec. Power Co., Inc. v. Connecticut, 131 S. Ct. 2527, 2536-37 (2011).

'"Id.at 2530-31.
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delegates the regulation of carbon dioxide emissions, not when the EPA
actually sets the standards."o
Despite the elimination of the federal common law claims relating
to carbon dioxide emissions, a State or private party may currently still
bring a suit under state law or state common law."' The Supreme Court
stated if a plaintiff was dissatisfied with the EPA's actions, the state or
private party "may petition for a rulemaking on the matter, and EPA's
response will be reviewable" in the court of appeals.1 2 The state or
private party may then petition for certiorari to the Supreme Court.11 3 The
federal courts can then force the agency to take action.1'14 The Supreme
Court seems to encourage litigation through a regulatory agency approach,
rather than through a state nuisance claim.
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court left unanswered the question of
whether a public nuisance claim under state law for carbon dioxide
emissions could successfully be brought.115 It is more difficult for
Congress to preempt state law than to preempt federal common law.
Preemption of state law "is compelled whether Congress' command is
explicitly stated in the statute's language or implicitly contained in its

"0 Id. at 2538.
Id. at 2539. The Supreme Court has left the question of whether a lawsuit may
proceed under state law or state common law open for consideration in the future. Id.
".

I12 Id. at 2530.
"'Id.
at 2530-31, 2539; 28 U.S.C. § 2112 (2006).
114 See generally Massachusetts v. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 549 U.S.
497 (2007).

Am. Elec. Power Co., Inc. v. Connecticut, 131 S. Ct. 2527, 2531 (2011).
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structure and purpose."ll6 Even so, a claim in state court will encounter
the same problems in federal court. In order to decide the case, the state
court will have to weigh the harm caused by global warming, economic
factors, and environmental effects. One difference is, in a state court, the
political question doctrine will not apply to the case at hand due to the
doctrine's purpose of preventing the branches of the federal government
from encroaching on each branch's responsibilities." 7 Plaintiffs could
flock to state courts as a result of the inability to sue under federal
common law. If a plaintiff does not want to sue under the Clean Air Act,
then the plaintiffs only recourse is to sue in state court. Subsequently, the
state courts may see a large increase in global warming lawsuits.
Even though it will be difficult for a state court to make decisions
regarding issues of global warming, state courts will probably still have to
wrestle with the issue because the Clean Air Act will likely displace state
common law and only partially displace state nuisance law." 8
The
Supreme Court has dealt with a similar situation before under the Clean
Water Act."' 9 In City ofMilwaukee v. Illinois & Michigan, Illinois
brought suit, under federal common law, against the city of Milwaukee
See "Supremacy Clause" U.S. Const. amend. VI, § 2; Gade v. National Solid Wastes
Mgmt. Ass'n, 505 U.S. 88, 98 (1992) (citing Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519,
525, 97 S. Ct. 1305, 1309, 51 L.Ed.2d 604 (1977); Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463
U.S. 85, 95, 103 S. Ct. 2890, 2899, 77 L.Ed.2d 490 (1983); Fidelity Fed. Say. & Loan
Ass'n. v. De la Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141, 152-153, 102 S. Ct. 3014, 3022, 73 L.Ed.2d 664
(1982)).
116

117May,

118See

supra note 85, at 132.

Int'l Paper Co. v. Ouellette, 479 U.S. 481 (1987).

119See City of Milwaukee v. Illinois & Michigan ("Milwaukee II"), 451 U.S. 304 (1981)
(holding the Clean Water Act displaces federal common law); See Int'l PaperCo., 479
U.S. at 481 (1987) (holding the Clean Water Act partially displaces state nuisance law).
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and other cities because the cities discharged inadequately treated and
untreated sewage into Lake Michigan.120 The Supreme Court held the
Clean Water Act displaced all federal common law.'21 In both City of
Milwaukee v. Illinois & Michigan and American Electric Power Co. Inc.,
v. Connecticut, the Supreme Court followed similar reasoning in holding
the respective Acts displaced federal common law.122 In City of
Milwaukee v. Illinois & Michigan, the Supreme Court vacated the
judgment and remanded the case, 123 without deciding if state nuisance law
was also displaced under the Clean Water Act.' 24

120

City of Milwaukee, 451 U.S. at 308-09.

121Id. at
122

332; Int'l Paper Co. v. Ouellette, 479 U.S. 481, 489 (1987).

See City of Milwaukee, at 314-17; See American Electric,
131 S. Ct. at 2558.

123 City of Milwaukee, 451

U.S. at 304. On remand, People of State of Ill. v. City of
Milwaukee ("Milwaukee II"), 731 F.2d 403 (7th Cir. 1984) ended up in the 7th Circuit.
The parties asked the court if the Clean Water Act also displaced a state's common or
statutory law when determining liability and remedies between two states. Id. at 406.
The court held that the Clean Water Act did preclude Illinois from applying state law in
interstate water pollution. Id. at 414. Despite the savings clause within the Clean Water
Act, which "authorize[ed] a suit for enforcement in the federal judicial district in which
the source is located ... [n]othing in this section shall restrict any right which any person
(or class of persons) may have under any statute or common law to seek enforcement of
any effluent standard or limitation or to seek any other relief (including relief against the
Administrator or a State agency)." Id. at 413-14 (quoting Subsection (e) of § 1365). The
court felt it was implausible that Congress meant to preserve state or common law
because discharges would have to meet both the "statutory limitations of all states
potentially affected by their discharges but also the common law standards developed
through case law of those states." Id. at 414. It would render any permit issued under the
Clean Water Act meaningless. Id. Therefore, the Clean Water Act also precludes both
state and common law. Id. at 406.
124

City of Milwaukee v. Illinois & Michigan, 451 U.S. 328 (1981).
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Six years later, the Supreme Court answered that question in
InternationalPaper Co. v. Ouellette.125 Vermont landowners brought suit
against a New York pulp and paper mill under Vermont nuisance common
law.126 The Supreme Court held the Clean Water Act preempted Vermont
nuisance law, but it was possible for suit to be brought under New York
law. 127
The Court began its analysis by noting the Clean Water Act gave
states a significant role in protecting their own territories by regulating
their own pollution.128 For example, before the federal government issues
a permit, the EPA Administrator must first "obtain certification from the
source State that the proposed discharge complies with the state's
technology-based standards and water-quality-based standards."' 29 On the
other hand, the Clean Water Act provides states with a much smaller role
in the regulation of pollution from another state.130 An affected state only
has the opportunity to object to the proposed standards at a public
hearing.131 An affected state's only remedy is to apply to the EPA
Administrator, who has the authority to void the permit if the pollution has

125

Int'l Paper Co. v. Ouellette 479 U.S. 481 (1987).

126Id. at 484. International Paper Company ("IPC"), the New York company,
operates a

pulp and paper mill, and discharged pollutants into Lake Champlain. Id. at 483-84.
127 Id. at 500.
128 Id. at
129

489; 33 U.S.C. § 1251(b) (2006).

Int'l Paper Co., 479 U.S. at 490; 33 U.S.C. § 1341(a)(1) (2006).

130Int'l Paper Co., 479 U.S. at 490.
131 Int'l Paper Co. v. Ouellette 479 U.S. 481 (1987) (citing 33 U.S.C. § 1341(a)(2)
(2006); People of State of Ill. v. City of Milwaukee, 731 F.2d 403, 412 (7th Cir. 1984)).
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an undue effect on interstate waters. 132 Affected states do not have the
ability to regulate out-of-state pollution.133
After the Court concluded affected states have a lesser role in
regulating the pollution of another state, the Court went on to examine if
the saving clause had preserved the right to sue under state or common
law.134 The savings clause stated:

"Nothing in this section shall restrict any right which any
person (or class of persons) may have under any statute or
common law to seek enforcement of any effluent standard
or limitation or to seek any other relief (including relief
against the Administrator or a State agency)."1 35

The Supreme Court interpreted this provision narrowly.136 The savings
clause stated "nothing in this section" will affect the right to sue.' 37 The
Court interpreted the savings clause as only referring to the provisions

32

1

Int'l PaperCo., 479 U.S. at 490-91 (citing 33 U.S.C.

§1342(d)(2)).

13 3 id.
34

1

1ntPaperCo., 479 U.S. at 492.

13'

33 U.S.C. § 1365(e) (2006) (emphasis added).

136

Int'l PaperCo., 479 U.S. at 492-93.

'

33 U.S.C.

§ 1365(e) (2006); Int'l Paper Co. v.
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within the section.1 3 8 Therefore, the savings clause did not preserve the
right to sue under state statutory law or state common law.' 39
The Court continued its analysis by looking at the purpose and
history of the Clean Water Act, and concluded that if states were allowed
to regulate other states' pollution, it would frustrate the purpose of the
Clean Water Act.140 Therefore, the Court held an affected state may not
bring a claim under state common law.141 Common law nuisance
standards are often vague, and if a common law suit were allowed to
proceed, the suit would hinder the Clean Water Act's purpose of
establishing "clear and identifiable" standards of discharge.142
Furthermore, pollution discharges would be forced to meet the common
law standards of every state the discharge flows into.143
An affected state suing under its state statutory law would also
have the same problems as a suit brought under common law. If the
affected state were to sue under its own law, then the affected states,
through lawsuits, could regulate the discharge from the source state. The
affected state could effectively circumvent the Clean Water Act's permit

tas Int'l PaperCo., 479 U.S. at 493.
139 id.

140 Id.
141

Id. at 496-97.

142 Id. at 496.
143

Int'l Paper Co. v. Ouellette 479 U.S. 481, 496 (1987).
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system and the source state's regulation.'" Thus, an affected state cannot
bring suit under its own law.145
However, nothing in the Clean Water Act prevents a state from
suing under the source state's own law.146 The Clean Water Act allows
states to set higher standards of discharge and authorizes suits under state
action.147 An action under the source state's law would not "disturb the
balance among federal, source-state, and affected-state interests."l 4 8 The
source state would not be subject to numerous and vague standards of
other states.149 Furthermore, it would not thwart the Clean Water Act's
permit system. 5 0 Therefore, InternationalPaperCo. v. Ouellette held, in
a lawsuit between two states, subject to the Clean Water Act, the plaintiff
cannot sue under the plaintiff's own state law; however, the plaintiff may
sue under the defendant's state law.' 5 '
An analogy can be made between the Clean Water Act and the
Clean Air Act due to their similarities. 152 By comparing the People of

'44Id. at 495.
145 Id. at

497.

146 id.
147 d.
148Id. at 499.
149Int'l

Paper Co. v. Ouellette 479 U.S. 481, 499 (1987).

'50 d
' Id. at 487.

See Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7601-7700 (2006); See
Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C.
§§ 1251-1387 (2006).
152

208

JOURNAL OF ENVTL & SUSTAINABILITY LAW, VOL. 19, No. 1

State ofIll. v. City ofMilwaukee,m American ElectricPower Co. Inc., v.
Connecticut,154 and InternationalPaper Co. v. Ouellette, it may be

possible to predict how the Supreme Court will decide if state statutory
and state common law claims will also preempted by the Clean Air Act.
The Clean Water Act's savings provision is similar to the Clean
Air Act's. The Clean Air Act's savings provision states:

"[n]othing in this section shall restrict any right which any
person ... may have under statute or common law to seek

enforcement of any emission standard or limitation or to
seek any other relief ... Nothing in this section or in any

other law of the United States shall be constructed to
prohibit, exclude, or restrict any State ... from bring any
enforcement action or obtaining any judicial remedy or
sanction in any State or local court." 55

Because the two savings clauses are so similar, it is likely the Court will
use the same analysis for both. Therefore, the savings clause in the Clean
Air Act will probably be interpreted as not expressively preserving the
right to sue under state statutory or state common law. If that is true, the
Court will look at the purpose of the Clean Air Act. If the Clean Air Act
allows a state to sue under the affected state's statutory or common law,

s Milwaukee II, 731 F.2d 403 (7th Cir. 1984).
Am. Elec. Power Co., Inc. v. Connecticut, 131 S. Ct. 2527 (2011).
' 42 U.S.C. § 7604(e)(1) (2006).

'1
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the regulations would be just as chaotic.156 An affected state could also
effectively regulate the pollution of another state, creating numerous
standards to be met. Conversely, if an affected state sued under the source
state's own pollution law, then the source state would not be subject to the
regulations of another state. Thereby, ensuring a state only has to meet
one standard to avoid being sued.
The Supreme Court has held the Clean Air Act has replaced
federal common law, and it is likely that state common law will be
preempted.1 57 Additionally, the Court is likely to hold that state law will
be partially displaced. The Court appears to be encouraging lawsuits
through regulations.'ss Nevertheless, forcing plaintiffs to proceed only
through a regulatory approach rather than also allowing lawsuits through
federal or state common law is not a good approach. Due the very nature
of its indistinct requirements, common law can serve as an indication of
the effectiveness of the regulations. If the regulations of the Clean Air Act
were set too low, then companies would be brought to court for
injunctions and other damages. If the standards were sufficient, then the
penalties imposed by the regulations would be enough to ensure there is
no need to sue under common law. The common law suits would serve as
an incentive for power plants to keep their greenhouse emissions low and
would signal how satisfied people are with the regulations.
The courts also have broad discretion in allowing cases to be heard
because of the indistinctness and vagueness of Article III standing.'
The discharge from water is very difficult to predict
where it would end up, however,
it is still easier to compare than air pollution.
156

American Electric, 131 S. Ct. at 2537-38.

1

' See id. at 2539.
159

See supra pgs. 12-13.
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Plaintiffs have to meet the three elements, which can be difficult due to the
nature of carbon dioxide emissions.
Lastly, the public concern about global warming has started to die
down over the past few years.160 Congress has been working on
controlling global warming, but climate change has taken a backseat to the
other problems the country is facing.'61 If Congress chooses to suspend or
eliminate the regulations concerning greenhouse emissions, then it should
be possible to sue under federal common law again. It remains to be seen
how Congress will deal with global warming during the 2012 presidential
election.

VI.

CONCLUSION

American Electric left many questions to be decided in the future.
American Electric answered whether a plaintiff could bring a claim for the
emission of carbon dioxide through federal common law, but left the
question of if a case could be brought under state statutory law or state
common law.' 62 Additionally, the Supreme Court did not clarify its stance

Hari M. Osofsky, AEP v. Connecticut's Implications for the Future of Climate Change
Litigation, 121 YALE L.J. ONLNE 101, 104 (2011).
160

161See

Elisabeth Rosenthal, Where did Global Warming Go?, N.Y. TIMES, Oct.15, 2011,
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/16/sunday-review/whatever-happened-toglobal-warming.html?pagewanted=all; See Joe Romm, The FailedPresidencyofBarack
Obama, Part2, Climate Progress,THINK PROGRESS (Nov 4, 2010, 4:26 PM),
http://thinkprogress.org/ronmi/2010/11/04/206982/the-failed-presidency-of-barackobama-2/.
162

Am. Elec. Power Co., Inc. v. Connecticut, 131 S. Ct. 2527, 2532-33 (2011).
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on Article III standing or the political question doctrine. It remains to be
seen why the Justices thought there was standing. Did the Court still agree
with their decision in Massachusetts v. EPA? Did the Court want to
distinguish Massachusetts v. EPA? Or did the Court again lower standing
requirements to allow the plaintiffs to sue?
Despite the lack of clarification, it is not likely the Court will allow
Article III standing or the political question doctrine to prevent plaintiffs
from presenting their case. Lawsuits under the Clean Air Act, through a
regulatory agency, will be allowed in the future.1 63 It is likely carbon
dioxide emission lawsuits will be allowed to proceed under the state law
of the polluting state. However, the Clean Air Act will likely close off all
other avenues. American Electric left many questions unanswered, and
people will be watching closely to see what the Court does in the future.

MARRIAM

16

Id. at 2533-35.

212

LIN

